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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT)
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,)

Plaintiff,)

and)

CAROL CHRISTOPHER, JULIE)
BHEND, and CARMELA CHAMARA,)

Plaintiff-Intervenors,)

Case No. A01-0225CV (JKS)

OPPOSITION TO RENEWED MOTION OF DEFENDANT NATIONAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
EEOC, et al. v. NEA, et al.
Case No. A01-0225CV (JKS)
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1 vs.)

2 NATIONAL EDUCATION)
 3 ASSOCIATION and NATIONAL)
 4 EDUCATION ASSOCIATION -)
 5 ALASKA,)

Defendants.)

6
 7 **OPPOSITION TO RENEWED MOTION OF DEFENDANT NATIONAL**
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

8 In *EEOC v. National Education Association*, 422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2005),
 9 the Ninth Circuit reinstated claims brought by the EEOC and the
 10 plaintiff-intervenors under Title VII against both NEA-Alaska and NEA. The court
 11 held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in favor of
 12 defendants on the question of whether the actions of Tom Harvey were “because of
 13 sex.” The court noted that the case “illustrates an alternative motivational theory in
 14 which an abusive bully takes advantage of a traditionally female workplace because
 15 he is more comfortable when bullying women than when bullying men.” *Id.* at 845.

16 As a part of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit, NEA sought to have the claims
 17 against it dismissed on grounds other than those on which this court granted
 18 summary judgment. NEA argued to the Ninth Circuit that “it is not a proper party
 19 in this action because it was not named in the original EEOC charges.” *Id.* at 847.
 20 NEA also argued that “it ‘cannot in any event be held responsible under Title VII
 21 for the alleged harassment’ because it did not exercise sufficient authority and

22 OPPOSITION TO RENEWED MOTION OF DEFENDANT NATIONAL
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1 control over Harvey's conduct or the conditions of his employment." *Id.* The
 2 Ninth Circuit held that both issues should be addressed on remand, but in doing so,
 3 provided guidance to this court regarding the treatment of those issues. The court
 4 noted that, "failure to name [a] party in the original charges is not dispositive" on
 5 the question of whether the court would have jurisdiction over Title VII claims. *Id.*
 6 The court also observed, concerning the responsibility of NEA for Harvey's
 7 conduct, that, "These are *fact-intensive questions* that have not been addressed by
 8 the district court and *as to which the record has not been fully developed.*" *Id.*
 9 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this guidance, NEA has now renewed its
 10 summary judgment motion, arguing *on the same record presented to the Ninth*
 11 *Circuit* – a record that, according to the Ninth Circuit, was not "fully developed"
 12 enough justify judgment in favor of NEA as a matter of law – that summary
 13 judgment is appropriate on both lack of jurisdiction and liability.

14 The "fact-intensive" questions presented by NEA's role in both assigning
 15 Harvey to its Alaska affiliate, and employing him upon his arrival in Alaska, cannot
 16 be resolved on summary judgment. Plaintiffs have presented evidence in this case
 17 that the NEA was responsible for bringing Tom Harvey, the "abusive bully"
 18 referred to by the Ninth Circuit, to its Alaska affiliate. The documents and
 19 testimony clearly illustrate that Tom Harvey was "assigned" to NEA's Alaska
 20 affiliate by the NEA. NEA's own documents and testimony show that Harvey was
 21 an employee of NEA, both prior to and at the time of his assignment by NEA to

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Alaska, as well as during the first 18 months of his time as a supervisor at NEA-Alaska. Under the guidelines for the program in which Harvey participated as an Executive Director and was employed by NEA, the Unified State Executive Director Program ("USEDP"), NEA established standards and procedures for the retention, evaluation and termination of participants in the program, including Harvey. The evidence shows that NEA, through its management, was *directly* responsible for Harvey's assignment and placement in Alaska. The evidence also shows that, prior to Harvey's assignment to Alaska, NEA had both *actual and constructive knowledge* of Harvey's propensity for shouting, yelling and terrorizing women in the workplace. This evidence provides support for plaintiffs' claim that NEA violated Title VII by placing a known harasser of women – its own employee – in the NEA-Alaska workplace, thereby "interfering" in the employment relationship between plaintiff-intervenors and NEA-Alaska.

I. FACTS

Although NEA has included a lengthy "Statement of Facts" in its memorandum in support, many of the salient facts concerning the basis for its liability have been either omitted or briefly touched upon in its brief. In this opposition, plaintiffs will attempt to shed light on those facts, based on the evidence that has been uncovered concerning Mr. Harvey, his employment history and background, and his relationship to both NEA and NEA-Alaska. Plaintiffs have previously responded to NEA's original Motion for Summary Judgment, and have

1 submitted exhibits in support of that opposition. This opposition to the renewed
2 motion will cite to, and incorporate by reference, the exhibits previously submitted
3 in opposing NEA's summary judgment motion (Exhibits 1 through 25 to
4 Opposition to Motion of Defendant National Education Association for Summary
5 Judgment [Docket No. 105]), as well as additional Exhibits 26 and 27 submitted
6 herewith.

7 **A. Employment History and Background of Thomas Harvey**

8 As noted by NEA, Harvey began his work with NEA state affiliate
9 organizations in Maine in the mid-1980s. NEA Memo. in Support, p. 10. After
10 working in Maine, and in Texas from 1986 to 1992, Harvey was hired by the
11 Teachers Association of Baltimore County ("TABCO") as its Executive Director.
12 *Id.* While at TABCO, Harvey supervised several female employees, including
13 Carole Jeffries and Linaya Yates-Lea.

14 Jeffries was a UniServ Director and Executive Assistant Director for
15 Communications at TABCO during the time that Harvey served as Executive
16 Director. *See* Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of C. Jeffries, p. 9. On multiple occasions,
17 Harvey pointed, yelled and acted in a physically threatening manner towards
18 Jeffries. *See* Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of C. Jeffries, pp. 227-240. One incident, as
19 described by Jeffries, was particularly chilling. Jeffries describes what happened
20 after she left a meeting involving the TABCO President, Edward Veit, and Harvey.

21 Q. You left the room to take some medicine?

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- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. I went in the kitchen because we keep little bags of snacks or
4 whatever and usually I have to take something with the
medication.
- 5 Q. How far away was the kitchen?
- 6 A. Twenty feet.
- 7 Q. Okay. And what did you do when you got to the kitchen?
- 8 A. Well, when I first got there, I just walked in and I thought, I
9 was tired, and I just sat in the kitchen chair and leaned back
like that. And I didn't even realize anybody was in there when
10 I first walked in. I just walked in and sat down. I thought let
me get myself together and decide, you know, what I'm going
11 to do. And then because -- the two Kathys were there in there.
And I almost remembered the other one's last name. They
12 heard all that yelling and screaming. Everybody in the office
can hear. Even when the doors were closed, everybody could
13 hear it. They thought that I had been attacked. They knew
that, you know, things were not great and they thought that
14 Tom had attacked me and they're coming over, what did he do
to you.
- 15 Q. So the two Kathys were already in the kitchen --
- 16 A. They were already in the kitchen.
- 17 Q. -- when he got there?
- 18 A. And they came -- they were approaching me. They hadn't
19 even gotten to as far as where I was sitting and before they
could even get to where I was, Tom came flying in the room,
20 which scared them. They both jumped back. And I didn't do
anything because I thought, what is this all about.
- 21 Q. What did Mr. Harvey do when he entered the room?

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1 A. Tom walked directly over to me leaned across me, I'm leaning
2 backwards -- that's the closest -- well, one of the closest times
3 he's gotten to me, but I think that may have been the closest.

4 Q. Were you standing?

5 A. No. I was lying back in the chair, like slouched back in the
6 chair. And he's this close to my nose and he's shaking his
7 finger. And I thought, I'm amazed he didn't touch me. And
8 he's screaming at me at the top of his lungs, spewing, you
9 know, spit and whatever, screaming in my face, if you know
10 what's good for you, you'll get your ass back in that room,
11 meaning in the room. And I said, that's when I said to him,
12 how could you speak to me this way.

13 Q. Let me just ask you, is that the way he said it to you?

14 A. Yes. He had kind of an impediment or something with his -- I
15 don't know what, harelip or something, whatever, he wore a
16 mustache to cover.

17 Q. Did he have his voice raised?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. Can you --

20 A. He was gritting his teeth as he was doing it, but it was -- it was
21 loud and it was -- you know, I'm not -- I can't yell as loud as
22 he.

Q. Yeah. I know you're having some difficulty with the voice,
but could you approximate for us?

A. How loud?

Q. Yeah.

A. I couldn't do that today.

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1 Q. But it was -- his voice was raised?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Was his face red?

4 A. Oh, yes.

5 Q. Okay. And you showed your finger, you had it towards your
6 face?

7 A. His finger was pointing right at my nose, standing over me,
8 yelling down at me.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I mean, I was in a vulnerable position. I mean, I guess, I don't
11 know, if I were a man, if I were stronger or didn't think he
12 was crazy, I may have had a different reaction.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. But I just --

15 Q. And you --

16 A. I couldn't believe it. I think I was in total shock that he would
17 even do that.

18 Q. And he said something to the effect if you know what's good
19 for you, you'll get your ass back in that room right now?

20 A. That's what he said.

21 Q. Okay. Did he say anything else when he was in the kitchen, to
22 you?

A. When I asked him why he would do that and especially do that
in front of witnesses, that's when he said, what witnesses, and
he looked around like this and he goes, you get in that room
now or you'll be insubordinate. That's when he whispered.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And I went in there.

3 See Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of C. Jeffries, pp. 229-233. Jeffries went on to
4 describe other instances where Harvey had yelled in a violent and extreme fashion
5 at her, putting his finger in her face while doing so. *Id.* at pp. 235-240. These
6 incidents left Jeffries frightened, and in fear for her safety. *Id.*

7 In response to this conduct and other actions taken against her by Harvey,
8 Jeffries filed a grievance through her union, the Maryland State Teachers
9 Association Professional Staff Organization ("MSTA PSO"). See Exhibit 2,
10 Deposition Exh. 142. In the grievance, which was directed to Harvey as TABCO
11 Executive Director, Jeffries' representative noted the "hostile work environment"
12 being encountered by Jeffries, and stated to Harvey that he had "attempted to
13 engaged in overt intimidation of Ms. Jeffries by raising your voice and leaning
14 across the table toward her in response to her questions regarding the lack of
15 positives in your review of her work." *Id.* The letter also described the incident
16 noted above, where Harvey had ordered "her back into a meeting by screaming 'If
17 you know what's good for you, you'll get your ass back in there!'" *Id.* Ms. Jeffries
18 also filed multiple EEOC complaints concerning Harvey. See Exhibit 3.

19 Harvey also yelled, with his finger extended in her face, at Linaya
20 Yates-Lea, who was a co-worker of Jeffries at TABCO. See Exhibit 5, Depo. of
21

1 L. Yates-Lea, p. 18. He raised his voice to her during most of their interactions.
 2 *Id.* at pp. 21-22. Both Yates-Lea and Jeffries testified that the incidents of yelling
 3 and shouting by Harvey at TABCO caused their national union, the National Staff
 4 Organization ("NSO"), to impose sanctions on TABCO. *See* Exhibit 5, Depo. of
 5 L. Yates-Lea, p. 37; Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of C. Jeffries, p. 245. The sanctions
 6 served to discourage employees at other NEA affiliates from applying to work at
 7 TABCO. *See* Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of C. Jeffries, pp. 251-252. The sanctions
 8 imposed by the NSO were publicized in the organization's newsletter of June 1994,
 9 in an article that stated as follows:

10 **TABCO Employees Forced Out**

11 NSO placed sanctions on the Teachers Association of Baltimore Co.
 12 (TABCO) for the actions of manager Tom Harvey. "He has forced
 13 through harassment [sic], threats, abusive language, shouting and
 other modes of intimidation [sic] the resignation of two female
 UniServ directors.

14 *See* Exhibit 6, Deposition Exhibit 148, p. 4. This newsletter was distributed to the
 15 entirety of the NSO membership nationwide, which consisted in 1994 of
 16 approximately 4,370 NEA state affiliate employees. *See* Exhibit 1, Second Depo.
 17 of C. Jeffries, p. 249; *see also* Exhibit 6 (Deposition Exhibit No. 148).

18 Harvey's penchant for engaging in extreme and abusive behavior towards
 19 women in work-related activities also was publicized concerning an incident
 20 involving an executive of a nurses' union in Baltimore. During that incident, which
 21 involved a woman named Susan Orthaus (now Powell), Harvey, according to the

1 woman, "pressed his body against mine and pushed me up against the door." *See*
 2 Exhibit 7, Depo. of S. Powell, p. 15. Harvey told her that "they [meaning TABCO]
 3 were going to represent the nurses and that I needed to get that in my head." *Id.*
 4 Criminal assault charges were filed against Harvey by the nurse. *Id.* at p. 17. The
 5 incident was reported by the Baltimore Sun in a newspaper article, *see* Exhibit 8
 6 (Deposition Exhibit 39), and was also reported on the local television news. *See*
 7 Exhibit 9, Depo. of M. Ambrose, p. 81.

8 Following the publicity associated with his "harassment, threats, abusive
 9 language, shouting," and other modes of intimidation against female employees at
 10 TABCO, and the criminal charge lodged against him in Baltimore for assaulting a
 11 female union executive, Harvey was retained by NEA to participate in the Unified
 12 State Executive Director Program ("USEDP"). *See* Exhibit 10, Document NEA
 13 0178. He became employed by NEA on September 1, 1994. *Id.* He remained an
 14 employee of NEA from that date until August 31, 1999. *See* Exhibit 11,
 15 Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of National Education Association, pp. 48-49. Harvey's
 16 first position while in the USED P was as the Executive Director of the Mississippi
 17 Association of Educators ("MAE"). Harvey served as MAE Executive Director
 18 from 1994 until his dismissal in 1998.

19 During Harvey's time as Executive Director of the Mississippi affiliate, NEA
 20 sent Larry Diebold, its then-Special Assistant to the Executive Director, to
 21 Mississippi to work on the relationship between Harvey and the leadership there.

1 See Exhibit 12, Depo. of L. Diebold, p. 85. "They didn't feel the relationship was
2 good enough to continue and wanted to know what their options might be in terms
3 of getting somebody else in there besides Mr. Harvey." *Id.*, Depo. of L. Diebold,
4 p. 84.

5 Conflicting testimony has been offered concerning why Harvey was
6 dismissed from his position as Executive Director for the NEA state affiliate in
7 Mississippi. Nelson Okino, former Pacific Regional Director of NEA, testified that
8 Harvey was made "available to the NEA" by the Mississippi affiliate because of a
9 rule concerning balance of white and African-American officials at the affiliate.

10 See Exhibit 13, Depo. of N. Okino, pp. 75, 99-100. The then-President of MAE,
11 Michael Marks, testified, however, that Harvey was dismissed by the affiliate's
12 Board of Directors because he "couldn't get along with people" and he was
13 "routinely abrasive to members" of the organization. See Exhibit 14, Depo. of
14 M. Marks, p. 18. In any event, following Harvey's dismissal by the MAE Board of
15 Directors, NEA made arrangements to pay a substantial portion of Harvey's
16 severance package, see Exhibit 15, NEA Document No. 0046, and also was
17 involved in the preparation of the terms of settlement and release between MAE and
18 Harvey. See Exhibit 16, NEA Document No. 0036. One of the terms of settlement
19 between MAE and Harvey, which NEA knew was included in the agreement, was
20 as follows:

1 Upon his departure from MAE, Tom Harvey's assignments under
 2 the USED Program *will be directed by NEA*, but they will no
 longer include any assignments in the state of Mississippi.

3 *Id.* at NEA Document No. 0042 (emphasis added). Following the execution of this
 4 agreement, NEA assigned Harvey to Alaska to act as Interim Assistant Executive
 5 Director of NEA-Alaska.

6 **B. Knowledge of NEA of Harvey's Abusive Conduct at TABCO**
 7 **and its Mississippi Affiliate**

8 As noted above, incidents involving Harvey's threatening and violent
 9 conduct in the workplace at TABCO were widely publicized, both in the general
 10 media in Baltimore and in a newsletter distributed to over 4,000 NEA affiliate
 11 employees nationwide. In addition to this notice of Harvey's conduct, several
 12 high-ranking officials of NEA were informed of this conduct by Carole Jeffries in
 13 1994. Jeffries told Earl Jones, who was then Director of Human and Civil Rights of
 14 NEA, about Harvey's conduct at TABCO. *See* Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of
 15 C. Jeffries, pp. 254-257. In addition to telling Jones that she believed that she was
 16 being discriminated against because she was a woman, Jeffries explained in detail
 17 to Jones what was happening to her in her workplace.

18 I told him [Jones] about the physical things, the finger pointing and
 19 the screaming and I told him about how he [Harvey] was interfering
 20 in my job search – or actually I don't know if I had begun yet, but
 21 how he kept asking me about leaving. We knew he had a reputation
 for being a staff breaker or whatever. That was part of the research
 that everyone was doing. And I thought, you know, how can
 anybody run you away from a job. That's ridiculous. We had these
 discussions.

1 But I told him that I had found out how he went about doing it, that
2 Linaya [Yates-Lea] was leaving and I felt that it was getting to the
3 point where I may need to consider doing the same thing myself
4 because every time I turned around, he was asking me, why didn't I
5 leave if I didn't like anything he asked me to do as he put it and
6 being told what to do or whatever, why don't you just leave. And he
7 would spew that and he would spit that out and scream it in my face,
8 why don't you leave, why don't you leave, and he'd always make
9 these terrible faces.

10 *Id.* at pp. 255-256. Jones told her that "it was terrible that he would do it and he
11 said that, you know, he's probably gotten away with it before and he'll probably get
12 away with it again, maybe you do need to think about leaving." *Id.* at p. 257. Jones
13 then referred Jeffries to Leon Felix, who was then Director of the Mid-Atlantic
14 Region for NEA, to discuss potential alternative employment at NEA. *Id.*

15 Jeffries then went on to contact Leon Felix, and told him what was
16 happening at the TABCO workplace.

17 Q. What details did you give him?

18 A. About how Tom [Harvey] was, you know, angry and yelling
19 at me and being – you know, setting me up with a different
20 standard, and, you know, it was just how we were being run
21 out of the office with intimidation.

22 *See Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of C. Jeffries, p. 258.*

Jeffries also talked to Eugene Dryer, the then Regional Director for the
Southeast at NEA, about Harvey's conduct at TABCO. Jeffries spoke to Dryer in
person about Harvey at the NEA Convention in 1994. *See Exhibit 1, Second Depo.*
of C. Jeffries, p. 125.

1 I explained to him it was more than a personality conflict that Tom
 2 and I had, that it was Tom's terrible treatment of me that caused the
 3 problem, and that I had filed the EEOC cases against him, charges
 4 against him, and that I had filed a grievance against him. And I said,
 5 I wouldn't have done that if he hadn't done those things to me, how
 6 in the world could you see – could you hire him or see him hired,
 7 help him getting hired in another area to do the same thing to
 8 somebody else.

9 See Exhibit 1, Second Depo. of C. Jeffries, pp. 261-262. She also related to Dryer
 10 "how generally he [Harvey] was intimidating again and that he treated me
 11 differently and yelled at me and screamed at me." *Id.* at p. 263.

12 Even though NEA had actual and constructive knowledge of Harvey's
 13 behavior at TABCO in 1994, Harvey was allowed to join the USEDPA, and become
 14 an employee of NEA, and the Executive Director of the NEA state affiliate in
 15 Mississippi.

16 Deloris Rozier, Director of Affiliate Capacity Building and Membership
 17 Organizing at NEA (*see* attached Exhibit 26, Depo. of D. Rozier, p. 3), testified that
 18 she went to Mississippi to assist Tom Harvey with "membership and capacity
 19 building" when he was Executive Director of the state affiliate. *Id.*, Depo. of
 20 D. Rozier, pp. 11, 12, 24 and 25. While in Mississippi, Ms. Rozier saw him engage
 21 in "yelling" and "pointing his finger" at a meeting in the affiliate workplace to such
 22 an extent that he was pulled out of the room by another NEA official. *Id.*, Depo. of
 D. Rozier, pp. 108-111. After witnessing this, Ms. Rozier told Larry Diebold, the
 NEA official who was later responsible for assigning Harvey to Alaska, "I

1 witnessed Tom's yelling. And because I have now seen it, we can deal with it."
 2 *Id.*, Depo. of D. Rozier, p. 112. While in Mississippi, Ms. Rozier discussed the
 3 inappropriateness of "yelling" in the workplace with Harvey on several occasions.
 4 *Id.*, Depo. of D. Rozier, pp. 113-121. Harvey told Ms. Rozier that he wanted "to
 5 change and be different." *Id.*, at p. 116. Harvey acknowledged to Ms. Rozier that
 6 his yelling presented a problem. *Id.* at p. 117. Ms. Rozier gave Harvey suggestions
 7 on how to address his yelling problem. *Id.* at pp. 117-118. Ms. Rozier told Harvey,
 8 "Yelling is not appropriate, Tom, for your staff, period," and "It's not appropriate to
 9 yell at your staff." *Id.* at p. 120.

10 **C. Assignment of Thomas Harvey by NEA to its Alaska Affiliate**

11 Upon his departure from MAE, Tom Harvey's assignments under
 12 the USED Program *will be directed by NEA*, but they will no
 longer include any assignments in the state of Mississippi.

13 Exhibit 16 at NEA Document No. 0042 (emphasis added).

14 Pursuant to this provision of the settlement agreement between Harvey and
 15 the NEA Mississippi affiliate, NEA proceeded to find another position for Harvey
 16 in the USED Program. Larry Diebold, then-Special Assistant to the Executive
 17 Director of NEA, testified that he discussed the availability of Harvey with Vernon
 18 Marshall, who was then Executive Director of NEA-Alaska, as well as an NEA
 19 employee. "And he [Marshall] wanted to know if he could get Harvey up there on
 20 some kind of a short-term basis to fill in for one of his managers." *See* Exhibit 12,
 21 Depo. of L. Diebold, p. 94. Diebold testified that he told Marshall that, "Yeah, he

1 [Harvey] could be available.” *Id.* at p. 95. Harvey was going to continue on the
 2 NEA payroll after going to Alaska, “as long as the agreement with Mississippi was
 3 still in place.” *Id.* at p. 98.

4 NEA and Harvey understood from the beginning of Harvey’s time in Alaska
 5 that he was being placed in Alaska as an employee of the national organization. In
 6 an e-mail from Harvey to Diebold at the outset of his employment in Alaska,
 7 Harvey suggested the following message be sent by NEA to him “Re: NEA-Alaska
 8 Assignment” in order to confirm his “employment with NEA.”

9 Your duties as an employee under USEDPA from 3/1/98 to 8/31/99
 10 include serving as the Interim Assistant Executive Director for NEA-
 11 Alaska. You will be located in Anchorage at least through 12/31/98.
 12 Your annual salary will be \$79,090 plus a \$1200 per month housing
 allowance. You will receive a step increase in accordance with the
 management schedule effective 9/1/98.

13 *See* Exhibit 17, NEA Document No. 0132. NEA Human Resources agreed to send
 14 the letter requested by Harvey “confirming his employment” with NEA. *Id.*, NEA
 15 Document No. 0131.

16 Other messages also confirmed Harvey’s placement by NEA at NEA-Alaska
 17 as an “assignment.” *See* Exhibit 18, Correspondence from V. Marshall to N. Okino,
 18 dated Feb. 23, 1998; Exhibit 19, Correspondence from V. Marshall to N. Okino and
 19 L. Diebold, dated Nov. 10, 1998. NEA has testified, in its Rule 30(b)(6) deposition,
 20 that Harvey was an employee of NEA until August 31, 1999. *See* Exhibit 11, Rule
 21 30(b)(6) Deposition of National Education Association, p. 49. Diebold has testified

1 that, after Harvey was assigned to Alaska, he continued on the NEA payroll. *See*
 2 Exhibit 12, Depo. of L. Diebold, p. 98. While in Alaska on assignment, Harvey
 3 completed NEA timesheets, and sent those to the NEA Pacific Region Office. *See*
 4 Exhibit 20, NEA Payroll Records from Deposition Exh. 28.

5 While Harvey was in Alaska as an employee of NEA, an NEA intern also on
 6 assignment to the Alaska affiliate, Karen Floyd, reported to NEA that Harvey was
 7 engaging in abusive conduct towards a female employee in Alaska. Ms. Floyd was
 8 an NEA intern at NEA-Alaska from around August to November 1998. *See*
 9 attached Exhibit 27, Depo. of K. Floyd, pp. 15-16. This was during the period that
 10 Tom Harvey was on assignment by NEA to NEA-Alaska, and was an NEA
 11 employee under the USEDIP program. *See* Exhibits 11 and 12. During her
 12 internship, Ms. Floyd called Ms. Rozier at NEA headquarters to tell her of the
 13 “extremely uncomfortable ... working conditions” that she was encountering in the
 14 NEA-Alaska workplace. *Id.*, Depo. of K. Floyd, pp. 25-26. Ms. Floyd had seen
 15 Carol Christopher crying after encounters with Tom Harvey, and heard “yelling,
 16 screaming and bamming on the desk coming from Tom Harvey’s office.” *Id.* at
 17 p. 26. “So I would walk by, I would see him bamming on the desk, yelling at
 18 Carol.” *Id.*, Depo. of K. Floyd, p. 27. ***When Ms. Floyd told Ms. Rozier of these***
 19 ***events, Ms. Rozier told her, “Don’t get involved.”*** *Id.*, Depo. of K. Floyd, p. 28.
 20 Ms. Floyd saw Ms. Christopher crying “about four or five times” in the office. *Id.*,
 21 Depo. of K. Floyd, p. 29. Ms. Christopher told her, “He’s yelling at me ... He’s

1 intimidating me.” *Id.* Ms. Floyd personally observed Harvey engaging in “yelling
 2 ... extremely loud ... bamming on the desk” in the presence of Ms. Christopher
 3 “somewhere between maybe 7 and 10 times.” *Id.*, Depo. of K. Floyd, p. 36.
 4 Ms. Floyd also heard Harvey use profanity at Ms. Christopher during these
 5 “yelling” episodes. *Id.*, Depo. of K. Floyd, p. 133.

6 **D. NEA’s Control of Harvey’s Employment Under the USEDPA** 7 **Guidelines**

8 The National Education Association Guidelines for the Unified State
 9 Executive Director Program, which are attached to the Declaration of Patricia Ann
 10 Orrange, filed with NEA’s Memorandum in Support, as Exhibit B, serve as the
 11 rules under which the USEDPA is administered. Those rules illustrate, contrary to
 12 the declaration submitted by Ms. Orrange, that NEA reserved authority and control
 13 over the hiring, supervision, direction, evaluation, discipline, and termination of
 14 participants in the USEDPA, which included Thomas Harvey from September 1,
 15 1994, through his assignment by NEA to a management position at NEA-Alaska in
 16 February 1998, until August 31, 1999.

17 • Under the guidelines, NEA has reserved authority over the selection
 18 of Executive Directors in the USEDPA.

19 If the SA [State Association] wishes to have its incumbent executive
 20 director serve as the USEDPA Executive Director, the SA shall so
 21 inform NEA. *If NEA gives its approval*, the SA’s incumbent
 22 executive director shall be selected to serve as the USEDPA Executive
 Director.

1 If an incumbent executive director is not selected to serve as the
 2 USEDPA Executive Director, *NEA and the SA shall jointly develop a*
 3 *list of persons that they consider qualified to serve as the USEDPA*
Executive Director. ... The SA shall select from this list the person
 that it wishes to have serve as the USEDPA Executive Director.

4 See Orrange Decl., Exh. B, p. 5 (emphasis added).

5 • As has been noted, the guidelines provide that, "The USEDPA
 6 Executive Director shall be an employee of the NEA, ..." *Id.* The guidelines also
 7 state that, "NEA shall pay the USEDPA Executive Director his or her salary in
 8 installments in accordance with NEA's regular payroll practices," and go on to
 9 require certain minimum and maximum levels of salary to be paid to USEDPA
 10 Executive Directors, as well as benefits to be provided. *Id.* at pp. 5-6.

11 • The guidelines call for "NEA, the SA and the person selected to serve
 12 as USEDPA Executive Director" to "jointly determine the USEDPA Executive
 13 Director's starting date *and the length of the term of his or her employment...*" *Id.*
 14 at p. 8 (emphasis added).

15 • The guidelines provide that, "At the request of NEA, the USEDPA
 16 Executive Director shall attend a reasonable number of training sessions,
 17 workshops, and/or other meetings designed to improve his or her effectiveness as
 18 the USEDPA Executive Director..." *Id.* at p. 9.

19 • A procedure for the evaluation of USEDPA Executive Directors is
 20 required under the guidelines.

1 The SA, *after consulting with the NEA Executive Director*, shall
 2 institute a procedure for evaluating the performance of the USED
 3 Executive Director. The specific nature of the evaluation procedure
 4 shall be determined by the SA, *provided that the SA, in consultation*
with the NEA Executive Director, shall evaluate the USED
Executive Director's performance in writing at least annually.

5 *Id.* at p. 9 (emphasis added).

6 • The guidelines provide detailed rules concerning the circumstances
 7 under which USED Executive Directors may be terminated. *Id.* at pp. 9-12.
 8 Provisions concerning appropriate severance pay in the event of voluntary
 9 termination, conduct justifying termination for "cause," and inability of a USED
 10 Executive Director to perform his or duties are included. *Id.*

11 • The guidelines provide "minimum" standards for agreements between
 12 state associations and the USED Executive Directors, including requiring that all
 13 such agreements provide, among other terms, that, "The USED Executive Director
 14 is an employee of NEA under the USED..." *Id.* at p. 12.

15 **E. NEA's Early Notice and Handling of EEOC Charges**

16 NEA asserts that it does not belong in this suit because NEA and
 17 NEA-Alaska are two separate and autonomous organizations. However, testimony
 18 from high level NEA and NEA-Alaska officials belie this assertion. And, the
 19 depositions of former NEA-Alaska Executive Director Vernon Marshall, NEA
 20 General Counsel Bob Chanin, NEA Associate Counsel Maurice Joseph, NEA
 21 Executive Director John Wilson, and NEA Regional Director Nelson Okino reveal

1 frequent contacts between NEA-Alaska and NEA soon after the filing of the
 2 intervenors' EEOC charges in April concerning the claims underlying the lawsuit
 3 filed in this matter. In fact, the testimony of NEA counsel indicates an
 4 attorney-client relationship with its affiliates, in particular, MAE and NEA-Alaska.
 5 *See* Exhibit 21, Depo. of M. Joseph, p. 38.

6 • M. Joseph and B. Chanin talk with Marshall about the EEOC charges
 7 soon after they were filed. *See* Exhibit 21, Depo. of M. Joseph, p. 9.

8 • Marshall discussed the complaints with NEA General Counsel Bob
 9 Chanin both at the time that the EEOC charges were filed in 2000, and at the time
 10 that the lawsuit was filed in 2001. *See* Exhibit 22, Depo. of V. Marshall,
 11 pp. 162-165.

12 • Marshall talked with Nelson Okino, NEA Pacific Region Director, on
 13 November 6, 2000, about the EEOC complaints filed by the plaintiff-intervenors,
 14 reviewing details of the complaints in that conversation. *See* Exhibit 22, Depo. of
 15 V. Marshall, pp. 258-259; Exhibit 23 attached Exhibit B, Diary of V. Marshall
 16 (D05194).

17 • NEA General Counsel Chanin, NEA-Alaska Counsel Leslie
 18 Longenbaugh, Marshall, and Harvey hold a phone conference concerning the
 19 lawsuit filed by the EEOC. *See* Exhibit 24, Depo. of Chanin, pp. 16-17.

20 • Marshall discussed the EEOC lawsuit with NEA Executive Director
 21 John Wilson at a meeting on September 27, 2001. *See* Exhibit 22, Depo. of

1 V. Marshall, p. 188. During the conversation, Marshall requested that Wilson
 2 provide him with copies of Carol Christopher's e-mails and personnel files, as she
 3 had recently been an NEA employee. *Id.*, p. 189.

4 Thomas Harvey also testified concerning contact with NEA about the claims
 5 filed by plaintiff-intervenors. Harvey stated that he had participated in a telephone
 6 conference with Vernon Marshall, NEA General Counsel Bob Chanin, and
 7 NEA-Alaska counsel "probably somewhere in the summer of 2000" regarding the
 8 filing of the EEOC charges. *See* Exhibit 25, Depo. of T. Harvey, pp. 117-120.

9 NEA Associate Counsel Joseph had between three to four conversations with
 10 NEA-Alaska Counsel Leslie Longenbaugh concerning the drafting of the response
 11 to the plaintiffs' motion to join NEA as a defendant in the lawsuit. *See* Exhibit 21,
 12 Depo. of M. Joseph, p. 17.

13 The evidence, therefore, is undisputed that NEA received information, on
 14 multiple occasions, concerning both the EEOC charges filed by the intervenors in
 15 2000 and the lawsuit filed by the EEOC in 2001. NEA's claim that it had no real
 16 knowledge of this matter and therefore no opportunity to participate in the ultimate
 17 conciliation process is clearly not true.

18 **F. Summary**

19 The facts and evidence offered by plaintiffs here illustrate that NEA had
 20 early knowledge of the EEOC charges filed against NEA-Alaska because of
 21 Harvey. NEA knew it was intimately involved in placing Harvey in the

1 NEA-Alaska office and it should have anticipated being included in the court
2 action.

3 The facts and evidence offered by plaintiffs also illustrate that NEA had
4 institutional knowledge of abusive behavior towards women by Thomas Harvey in
5 the workplace prior to and during his assignment – as an NEA employee – to
6 NEA-Alaska. The women who had been verbally abused and threatened by Harvey
7 gave high-ranking officials at NEA detailed accounts of what had happened to them
8 at TABCO. These NEA officials knew that Harvey had engaged in this conduct
9 prior to his inclusion in the USEDP, and his assignment by NEA to its Alaska
10 affiliate. NEA also had knowledge of Harvey's abusive behavior during his time in
11 the USEDP, as an employee of NEA, in Mississippi and Alaska. As a participant in
12 the USEDP, Harvey's retention, evaluation, training, salary, benefits, and
13 termination were all governed by the NEA, under terms of NEA guidelines. These
14 facts are to be considered established for purposes of this motion.

15 **II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

16 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
17 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
18 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
19 entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary
20 judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for trial. *Warren v. City of*
21 *Carlsbad*, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995), *cert. denied*, 516 U.S. 1171 (1996). The

1 moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
2 material fact. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving
3 party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party
4 must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts that show a genuine issue for trial.
5 *Id.* at 324. Assuming that there has been sufficient time for discovery, summary
6 judgment should be entered against a “party who fails to make a showing sufficient
7 to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
8 that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” *Id.* at 322.

9 Special rules of construction apply to evaluating summary judgment
10 motions: 1) all reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material
11 fact should be resolved against the moving party; 2) all inferences to be drawn from
12 the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
13 party; and 3) the court must assume the truth of direct evidence set forth by the
14 nonmoving party if it conflicts with direct evidence produced by the moving party.
15 *T.W. Electrical Service v. Pacific Electrical Contractors*, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th
16 Cir. 1987). When different ultimate inferences can be reached, summary judgment
17 is not appropriate. *Sankovich v. Life Ins. Co. of North America*, 638 F.2d 136, 140
18 (9th Cir. 1981). The issue of material fact required by Rule 56 to entitle a party to
19 proceed to trial need not be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its
20 existence; all that is required is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual
21 dispute to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

1 truth at trial. *Id.* At this stage of the litigation, the judge does not weigh conflicting
 2 evidence or make credibility determinations. These determinations are the province
 3 of the fact finder at trial. *Id.*; see also *Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.*, 85
 4 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996) (on a motion for summary judgment, the court is not
 5 to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determine
 6 whether there is a genuine issue for trial).

7 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that a high standard exists for the granting
 8 of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. *Schnidrig v. Columbia*
 9 *Machine, Inc.*, 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996) (courts should require very little
 10 evidence to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case, because the
 11 ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry – one
 12 that is most appropriately conducted by the fact-finder, upon a full record (citations
 13 omitted)); see also *Lam v. University of Hawaii*, 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994)
 14 (quoting *Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist.*, 934 F.2d 1104,
 15 1111 (9th Cir. 1991)). See also, Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:
 16 Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding
 17 Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982 (2003)
 18 (“Given the fact that hyperactive use of pretrial motions threatens long-standing
 19 constitutional values, courts should err on the side of the use of a trial and a jury.”).

III. ARGUMENT

A. Under the Facts as Established for Purposes of this Motion, NEA Unlawfully Interfered with Plaintiff-Intervenors' Employment Opportunities at NEA-Alaska, Thereby Violating Title VII

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual *or otherwise to discriminate against any individual* with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....” (Emphasis added.) This language has been interpreted to encompass situations in which “a defendant subject to Title VII interferes with an individual’s employment opportunities with another employer.” *Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47*, 633 F.2d 880, 883 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980).

The “interference with employment opportunities” claim under Title VII was first articulated in *Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson*, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In that case, a male employee of a nursing referral office alleged that supervisors at the defendant hospital, which was not his direct employer, had refused to put him to work because he was not female. The district court denied the defendant hospital’s motion for summary judgment, and the defendant hospital appealed. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that Title VII would apply to the actions of the defendant hospital, even though the hospital was not the direct employer of the plaintiff employee. “To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances

1 peculiarly affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an
 2 individual's employment opportunities with another employer, while it could not do
 3 so with respect to employment in its own service, would be to condone continued
 4 use of the very criteria for employment that Congress has prohibited." *Id.* at 1341.

5 The Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue of indirect employer liability
 6 under *Sibley* in *Lutcher*, where the court noted that for Title VII to apply, "there
 7 must be some connection with an employment relationship," though the
 8 "connection ... need not necessarily be direct." *Id.* at 883. Citing *Sibley*, the court
 9 explained that "[t]his might occur where a defendant subject to Title VII interferes
 10 with an individual's employment opportunities with another employer." *Id.* at n.3.
 11 In *Gomez v. Alexian Brothers Hospital*, 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth
 12 Circuit again applied the reasoning of *Sibley*, holding that the defendant hospital
 13 could be held liable under Title VII for its discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff,
 14 notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was employed by a third party, if the
 15 defendant had interfered with the plaintiff's employment by that third party.

16 In *Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California*, 231 F.2d 572
 17 (9th Cir. 2000) ("*AMAE*"), the Ninth Circuit again held a third party could be held
 18 liable for discrimination under Title VII. In that case, the plaintiffs were a class of
 19 Mexican-American, Asian-American, and African-American prospective and
 20 current teachers who challenged California's use of a skills test – which was a
 21 prerequisite to employment in the state's public schools – under Title VII. *Id.* at

1 577. The plaintiffs alleged that the test had a disparate impact on minorities. *Id.* at
 2 578.

3 The Ninth Circuit *en banc* held that Title VII covered the plaintiffs' claims,
 4 agreeing with the district court that the allegedly racially discriminatory test
 5 "interfered" with the plaintiffs' relationship with their future employers, the school
 6 districts. "Our conclusion is dictated by the peculiar degree of control that the State
 7 of California exercises over local school districts." *Id.* at 581. "Against that
 8 background of 'plenary' state control, we have no difficulty concluding that the
 9 State of California is in a theoretical *and* practical position to 'interfere' with the
 10 employment decisions of local school districts." *Id.* at 582 (emphasis supplied).
 11 The court likened the relationship between the State of California and the local
 12 school districts to the relationship between a corporate parent and its wholly owned
 13 subsidiaries. In analyzing that relationship, the court stated as follows:

14 'In the absence of special circumstances, a parent corporation is not
 15 liable for the Title VII violations of its wholly owned subsidiary.'
 16 *Watson v. Gulf & W. Indus.*, 650 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1981). In
 17 *Watson*, this court held that the parent corporation was not subject to
 18 Title VII because the case presented no 'special circumstances.' *Id.*
 19 But the court went on to explain that, '[i]f there was any evidence
 20 that [the parent] participated in or influenced the employment
 21 policies of [the subsidiary], ... then we would be presented with a
 22 very different case.' *Id.* Ours is that 'very different case.' The
 'parent' state has participated extensively in, and influenced, the
 employment policies and practices of the 'subsidiary' local school
 districts; therefore, the state is covered by Title VII.

23 *Id.*

1 The recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in *Anderson v. Pacific Maritime*
 2 *Assn.*, 336 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2003), further clarified the standard to be applied in
 3 determining whether a third party may be held liable for “interference” with an
 4 employment relationship under Title VII. In that case, longshoremen employed by
 5 various companies brought an action against an association of those employers, the
 6 Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”), which negotiated the Collective Bargaining
 7 Agreement under which the longshoremen worked. The court noted that the
 8 association had no control or influence over the conditions of the workplaces in
 9 which the longshoremen were employed.

10 Under the CBA, the member-employers and their walking bosses
 11 and foremen – but not PMA – have the responsibility to ‘supervise,
 12 place or discharge men and to direct the work and activities of
 13 longshoremen on the job in a safe, efficient and proper manner.’
 14 The member-employers – but not PMA – also retain the right to
 15 discipline any longshoremen for ‘incompetence, insubordination or
 16 failure to perform the work as required in conformance with the
 17 provisions of [the CBA].’ The CBA lays out an extensive system for
 18 maintaining discipline, safety, and conformity with the master labor
 19 agreement on the docks, but these provisions place the burden of
 20 meeting these standards on the longshoremen, the Union, and the
 21 member-employers and their supervisors – not PMA.

16 *Id.* at 926. The court went on to explain the various additional ways in which PMA
 17 had no control over the conditions under which the longshoremen worked. “It does
 18 not supervise the longshoremen. It has no power to hire or fire the longshoremen.
 19 It has no power to discipline longshoremen. It does not supervise the work sites of
 20 its member-employees. It is undisputed that the monitoring and control over those
 21

1 sites, as well as the control of the employees, is within the *sole* province of the
2 member-employers.” *Id.* at 927 (emphasis supplied).

3 Under these circumstances, the court held that the PMA could not be held
4 liable under Title VII for the workplace conditions encountered by the plaintiff
5 longshoremen. The court stated its reasoning for the decision in a lengthy
6 discussion of the *Sibley* opinion, and the Ninth Circuit cases on the issue that
7 followed, and succinctly summarized its analysis as follows:

8 In light of these facts, we think the imposition of indirect-employer
9 liability under Title VII inappropriate. *Sibley* and its Ninth Circuit
10 progeny condone liability where there exists discriminatory
11 ‘interference’ by the indirect employer and where the indirect
12 employer had some peculiar control over the employee’s relationship
13 with the direct employer. Here, there was no such interference by
14 PMA. *It did not cause the hostile work environment.* And its
15 power to stop the hostile work environment was so limited that it
16 cannot be said to have ‘interfered’ by failing to take corrective
17 measures to stop the harassment when the power to take those
18 measures belonged to the member-employers.

19 *Id.* at 932 (emphasis added).

20 As applied to the present case, *Sibley* and its Ninth Circuit progeny require
21 that NEA’s summary judgment motion be denied. NEA both “interfered” with
22 plaintiff-intervenors’ employment opportunities at NEA-Alaska, and enjoyed
23 “peculiar control” over their relationship with NEA-Alaska. NEA “interfered” with
24 plaintiff-intervenors’ employment opportunities by placing and employing a known
25 harasser of women in the NEA-Alaska workplace. Viewing the facts in a light most
26 favorable to plaintiffs, NEA had detailed knowledge concerning Harvey’s prior

1 harassment of women, both at the time that he was approved for participation in the
 2 USEDPA, and at the time of his assignment by NEA to its Alaska affiliate. In
 3 addition, NEA had knowledge of Harvey's abusive behavior, both during his time
 4 as an NEA employee in Mississippi, and during his assignment as an NEA
 5 employee to Alaska. By placing Harvey in the NEA-Alaska workplace, and failing
 6 to take any action concerning his abusive conduct at NEA-Alaska while he was an
 7 NEA employee, NEA "interfered" with plaintiff-intervenors' ability to work in an
 8 environment free of harassment and intimidation. This constituted a violation of
 9 Title VII, under *Sibley* and its progeny.

10 As was noted in both *Sibley* and *AMAE*, "To permit a covered employer to
 11 exploit circumstances peculiarly affording it the capability of discriminatorily
 12 interfering with an individual's employment opportunities with another employer,
 13 while it could not do so with respect to employment in its own service, would be to
 14 condone continued use of the very criteria for employment that Congress has
 15 prohibited." *AMAE*, 231 F.2d at 580, *quoting Sibley*, 488 F.2d at 1341. If Carol
 16 Christopher, Julie Bhend, and Carmela Chamara had been directly employed by
 17 NEA, the placement and employment by NEA of a known harasser as their
 18 supervisor, with resulting harm, would have constituted a violation of Title VII.
 19 *See E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel*, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (Holding
 20 that "employers are liable for failing *to remedy or prevent* a hostile or offensive
 21 work environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the exercise

1 of reasonable care should have known.” (Emphasis supplied)). By assigning a
 2 known harasser to be a supervisor at its Alaska affiliate, and employing that
 3 supervisor even after learning of his abusive conduct, NEA failed to remedy and
 4 failed to prevent the hostile work environment that was encountered by
 5 plaintiff-intervenors at NEA-Alaska. NEA should not be allowed to escape its
 6 obligations as a covered employer under Title VII just because it did not issue
 7 paychecks to the plaintiff-intervenors. To do so “would be to condone continued
 8 use of the very criteria for employment that Congress has prohibited.” *AMAE*, 231
 9 F.2d at 580, *quoting Sibley*, 488 F.2d at 1341.

10 Unlike the defendant association in *Anderson*, NEA was directly involved in
 11 setting the terms and conditions of employment at NEA-Alaska. NEA sent *its own*
 12 *employees* to manage the workplace at NEA-Alaska. Harvey was an NEA
 13 employee when he came to Alaska. Vernon Marshall, the Executive Director of
 14 NEA-Alaska during the events at issue in this case, was an NEA employee, as a
 15 participant in the USEDPA. *See* Exhibit 12, Depo. of L. Diebold, p. 51. NEA had
 16 guidelines for the retention, evaluation, training, salary, benefits, and termination of
 17 these managers. Other NEA managers were responsible for assigning Harvey to
 18 Alaska. The defendant association in *Anderson* had *nothing* to do with the work
 19 environment encountered by the plaintiff employees; NEA had *everything* to do
 20 with creating the work environment faced by the plaintiff-intervenors here. In
 21 *Anderson*, the court stated that the defendant association “did not cause the hostile

1 work environment” at issue there. 336 F.3d at 932. Here, NEA *directly* caused the
2 hostile work environment, by sending the supervisor responsible for creating the
3 hostile work environment into the NEA-Alaska workplace, and continuing to
4 employ him even after learning of his abusive conduct.

5 In *AMAE*, the court noted that the relationship between the State of
6 California and its local school districts was akin to the relationship between a parent
7 and subsidiary corporation, and certainly that analogy would hold true for the
8 relationship between NEA and NEA-Alaska. As was also noted in *AMAE*, a parent
9 corporation could not be held liable for violations of Title VII by its subsidiary,
10 unless “there was ... evidence that [the parent] participated in or influenced the
11 employment policies of [the subsidiary]....” *AMAE*, 231 F.3d at 582, *quoting*
12 *Watson*, 650 F.2d at 993. In this case, NEA did influence the employment policies
13 and practices at NEA-Alaska by having its employees not only supervise the NEA-
14 Alaska workplace, but assign and place the management for that workplace as well.
15 One NEA employee, Thomas Harvey, engaged in the discriminatory practices at
16 issue in the case. Another NEA employee, Vernon Marshall, failed to remedy the
17 hostile work environment encountered by plaintiff-intervenors. NEA can attempt to
18 run from Harvey and Marshall, but it cannot hide. They were both NEA
19 employees. They were both subject to NEA guidelines concerning their hiring,
20 evaluation, training, performance, and termination. Other NEA employees, Larry
21 Diebold and Nelson Okino, were primarily responsible for assigning Harvey to his

1 management position at NEA-Alaska. There can be no question that NEA, through
2 its employees, was instrumental both in setting the terms and conditions of NEA-
3 Alaska employees, including plaintiff-intervenors, and in influencing the policies of
4 employment there.

5 In her dissent in *Anderson*, Judge Fletcher noted that the Ninth Circuit has
6 “adopted a broad interpretation of *Sibley*, with the caveat that ‘there must be some
7 connection with an employment relationship for Title VII protections to apply.’”
8 336 F.2d at 939, *quoting Lutch*, 633 F.2d at 883. There is nothing in *Anderson*
9 that departs from that “broad interpretation of *Sibley*.” *Anderson* involved an
10 association that had no influence on any aspect of the terms and conditions of the
11 plaintiff employees. As has been shown, NEA had a significant influence on the
12 terms and conditions of plaintiff-intervenors’ employment. NEA’s conduct
13 certainly had a “connection” – a significant connection – with the employment
14 relationship between plaintiff-intervenors and NEA-Alaska. Under such
15 circumstances, *Sibley* should be applicable to hold NEA responsible for violations
16 of Title VII and AS 18.80.220, as alleged in plaintiffs’ complaints.

17 NEA claims that, because it had no opportunity to “correct promptly any
18 sexually harassing behavior” by Harvey, it cannot be held liable for any Title VII
19 violation which may have occurred, under *Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth*, 524
20 U.S. 742 (1998), and *Faragher v. City of Boca Raton*, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). NEA’s
21 violation of Title VII, however, comes not only in the failure to **correct** the sexually

1 harassing behavior by Harvey, but rather by its failure to *prevent* the behavior from
 2 occurring. Karen Floyd testified that she told a highly-placed NEA official, Deloris
 3 Rozier, of Harvey's abusive conduct towards Carol Christopher in Alaska while
 4 Harvey was an NEA employee. NEA had an opportunity at that point to *prevent*
 5 *and correct* the abusive conduct being engaged in by Harvey, but consciously chose
 6 not to do so. The affirmative defense established by *Faragher* and *Ellerth* requires
 7 that an employer prove that it "exercised reasonable care to *prevent and correct*"
 8 the sexually harassing behavior at issue. *Faragher*, 524 U.S. at 807; *Ellerth*, 524
 9 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added). NEA was in a position to "prevent" Harvey's
 10 harassing behavior when it assigned Harvey to Alaska; it failed to meet that
 11 obligation. NEA was in a position, as Harvey's employer, to "prevent and correct"
 12 his conduct when it was informed of that conduct by Karen Floyd; it again failed to
 13 act. Under the USEDPA Guidelines, NEA had responsibility for the evaluation and
 14 training of participants in the USEDPA program, including Harvey. NEA failed to
 15 take any action to either prevent or correct Harvey's abusive conduct, despite
 16 having received notice of that conduct on multiple occasions throughout his time as
 17 an NEA employee.

18 NEA also argues that it should not be held responsible for Harvey's actions,
 19 even though he was an NEA employee at the time of his assignment and initial
 20 employment in Alaska, because it had no "right to control" his actions or conduct.
 21 This argument ignores the clear provisions of the USEDPA Guidelines, which

1 provide that the participants in the program are hired, evaluated, trained,
 2 compensated, and terminated subject to standards established by the NEA. This
 3 argument also ignores the provision of Harvey's severance agreement with the
 4 Mississippi affiliate, which was entered into with the full knowledge of NEA,
 5 which provided that, "Upon his departure from MAE, Tom Harvey's assignments
 6 under the USED Program *will be directed by NEA*, but they will no longer include
 7 any assignments in the state of Mississippi." See Exhibit 16. Under terms of both
 8 of these documents, NEA had the "right to control" Harvey. NEA may not have
 9 exercised the control that it had over Harvey, but it does not mean that it did not
 10 have the "right to control" his actions and conduct.

11 The self-serving declaration of Patricia Oorange concerning the reasons why
 12 Harvey was an NEA employee does not serve to mask the language of the
 13 documents that actually concerned his employment. The USED Guidelines, as
 14 well as other evidence offered concerning Harvey's employment by NEA, do not
 15 provide that Harvey was an NEA employee only for certain purposes. In fact, in
 16 her role as the Rule 30(b)(6) representative for NEA, Oorange did not state that
 17 Harvey's employment by NEA was conditional, or only for certain reasons.
 18 Certainly, NEA has every reason to distance itself from Harvey and his conduct;
 19 however, the documents applicable to his employment speak for themselves.
 20 Harvey was an NEA employee, both at the time of his assignment by NEA to its
 21 Alaska affiliate, and during his employment as Interim Assistant Executive

1 Director. No amount of “spin-doctoring” by NEA can change that core fact in this
2 case.

3 **B. NEA is a Proper Defendant even though It was not Named in the**
4 **Original EEOC Charges or Engaged in Conciliation**

5 The Ninth Circuit has long held that EEOC charges must be construed with
6 utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of
7 formal pleading. *Chung v. Pomona Valley Community Hosp.*, 667 F.2d 788, 790
8 (9th Cir. 1982), *quoting Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical and State*
9 *Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators*, 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.
10 1975); *see also Sosa v. Hiraoka*, 920 F.2d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1990). Further, the
11 EEOC charge “does not demand procedural exactness. It is sufficient that the
12 EEOC be apprised, in general terms, of the alleged discriminatory parties and the
13 alleged discriminatory acts.” *Id.* (*quoting Kaplan*, 525 F.2d at 1359); *see also Sosa*
14 *at 1458.*

15 The general rule is that, ordinarily, Title VII claimants may sue only those
16 named in the EEOC charge because only they had an opportunity to respond to the
17 charges during the administrative proceeding. *See 2 A. Larson Employment*
18 *Discrimination*, § 49.11(c)(2) (1990). However, the Ninth Circuit has carved out
19 two primary exceptions to this rule. One, a Title VII action can be brought against
20 persons not named in the EEOC charge as long as they were involved in the acts
21 giving rise to the EEOC claims. *Ortez v. Washington County*, 88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th

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1 Cir. 1996), *citing to Sosa v. Hiraoka*, 920 F.2d 1451, 1459 (9th Cir. 1990), *citing to*
 2 *Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosp.*, 726 F.2d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). Two, where
 3 the EEOC or defendants themselves “should have anticipated” that the claimant
 4 would name those defendants in a Title VII suit, the court has jurisdiction over
 5 those defendants even though they were not named in the EEOC charges. *Ortez*,
 6 *supra*, *citing to Sosa* at 1458-59. *See also Chung*, 667 F.2d at 792 (district court
 7 erred in dismissing claims against doctors not named in EEOC charge, but who
 8 participated in denial of promotions). In this case, the plaintiff-intervenors
 9 specifically alleged in their EEOC charges that Tom Harvey subjected them to
 10 workplace harassment. NEA, Harvey’s employer, assigned him to the NEA-Alaska
 11 office where the Title VII violations, the acts giving rise to this lawsuit, occurred.
 12 Given its employment relationship with Harvey, after it was notified of the
 13 intervenors’ charges soon after they were filed, NEA *should have anticipated*
 14 becoming a defendant in a subsequent action.

15 In addition, there are three other well-established “exceptions” to the general
 16 rule that Title VII claimants may sue only those named in the EEOC charge because
 17 only they had an opportunity to respond to the charges during the administrative
 18 proceeding apply to this case. *Sosa*, 920 F.2d at 1459. First, if the respondent
 19 named in the EEOC charge is a principal or agent of the unnamed party, or if they
 20 are “substantially identical parties,” suit may proceed against the unnamed party.
 21 Second, suit may proceed if the EEOC could have inferred that the unnamed party

1 violated Title VII. Third, if the unnamed party had notice of the EEOC conciliation
2 efforts and participated in the EEOC proceedings, then suit may proceed against the
3 unnamed party. *Sosa*, 920 F.2d at 1459 (quoting 2 A. Larson at § 49.11(c)(2)).

4 Professor Larson explains that:

5 Courts are particularly likely to invoke one of these exceptions when
6 the initial EEOC charge was filed without the assistance of counsel,
7 since the charging party may not understand the need to name all
parties in the charge, or may be unable to appreciate the separate
legal identities of, for instance, a corporation and its officers.

8 *Id.*

9 In analyzing the applicability of these exceptions to this case, we first note
10 that there is no indication that these women had any assistance of counsel in
11 preparing their charges. Second, since filing suit, the plaintiffs have been able to
12 uncover evidence of NEA's involvement in the Title VII violations and NEA's
13 knowledge of the EEOC investigation and conciliation process. NEA received
14 actual notice of the EEOC charges soon after they were filed. *See* Exhibit 21,
15 Depo. of M. Joseph, p. 9. It was represented in the conciliation proceedings by two
16 of its employees, Tom Harvey and Vernon Marshall.

17 In *Sosa*, the court held that the trustees who governed the District were
18 "substantially identical" parties. *Id.* at 1460. *Also see Chung* (it permitted suit
19 against doctors not named in the EEOC charge and whose only apparent role in
20 denial of promotions was as directors of the hospital named in the charge). 667
21 F.2d at 790, 792; *see also Kaplan*, 525 F.2d at 1359 (international union was

1 subject to Title VII suit where EEOC charge identified only the union local as a
2 respondent.); *see also Sosa*, 920 F.2d at 1460 (trustees were subject to Title VII suit
3 where EEOC charge identified only the District as a respondent.). In this case,
4 NEA controlled the workplace at NEA-Alaska, the respondent in these charges,
5 through its employees (Harvey and Marshall), just as the director-doctors governed
6 the hospital named as respondent in Chung's EEOC charges. The facts here are
7 more compelling than in *Chung*, *Kaplan*, or *Sosa*, in light of NEA's role; it placed
8 Harvey in the NEA-Alaska office notwithstanding its knowledge of his history of
9 previous civil rights abuses; it paid his wages and benefits; it retained power over
10 his employment and termination through the USEDPA Guidelines; and NEA
11 maintained an attorney-client relationship with NEA-Alaska, making NEA and
12 NEA-Alaska "substantially identical parties." NEA is a proper party to this court
13 action.

14 EEOC made an effort to ascertain the relationship between NEA and
15 NEA-Alaska during the administrative stage. NEA-Alaska represented to the
16 EEOC that there was no significant relationship between the two entities, and that
17 NEA had not participated in the hiring and retention of Harvey at NEA-Alaska. *See*
18 Exhibit 26. NEA, notwithstanding its notice of the charges, remained silent as
19 NEA-Alaska made inaccurate representations of its relationship with NEA, thereby
20 acquiescing to its representation by NEA-Alaska and its employees Harvey and
21 Marshall in the EEOC administrative procedure.

1 **C. Plaintiff-Intervenors' State-Law Claims Against NEA Have Not**
2 **Been "Voluntarily Dismissed"**

3 NEA states in its Renewed Motion that "the intervenors have voluntarily
4 dismissed their state-law claims," implying that the state-law claims as against NEA
5 have been dismissed. That is not accurate. As a result of the state court action in
6 *Christopher, et al. v. NEA-Alaska*, Case No. 3AN-04-3828 Civil, filed after
7 summary judgment was entered by this court in December 2003,
8 plaintiff-intervenors agreed to dismiss with prejudice the state-law claims brought
9 against NEA-Alaska. NEA, however, was not a party to that case; therefore, the
10 stipulation and order of dismissal could have had no application, and had no
11 application, to any claim, state or federal, brought against NEA by
12 plaintiff-intervenors. By the reinstatement of this case by the Ninth Circuit,
13 plaintiff-intervenors' state-law claims for violation of AS 18.80.220, negligent
14 hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress against NEA
15 have been reinstated, and have not been dismissed by way of any stipulation or
16 order. NEA has chosen not to include those claims in this motion, based apparently
17 on an erroneous understanding of the proceedings in the state court case, and
18 therefore any arguments concerning those claims have not been addressed in this
19 opposition.

CONCLUSION

The myriad arguments offered by NEA in support of its effort to be dismissed from this case without trial cannot hide the facts concerning its involvement with Tom Harvey. NEA employed Harvey as a participant in its USED P program. NEA employed Harvey at the time of his assignment to NEA-Alaska, and facilitated that assignment at the highest levels of its organization. NEA employed Harvey when he was Interim Assistant Executive Director. NEA caused Harvey to be employed in the NEA-Alaska workplace, where he created an extraordinarily hostile and frightening work environment. NEA knew that Harvey had engaged in such conduct in the past, yet still chose to assign him to a managerial position in Alaska. NEA learned that Harvey was acting in the same abusive manner while Harvey was an NEA employee in Alaska, yet failed to take any action concerning that conduct. These facts are established for purposes of this motion, and clearly support the claim that NEA “interfered” with the employment opportunities enjoyed by plaintiff-intervenors at NEA-Alaska. The facts also illustrate that NEA is a proper defendant in this action.

The position taken by NEA in support of this motion does not dispute the *existence* of evidence regarding the assignment and employment of Tom Harvey, but instead presents the view most favorable to NEA of how that evidence should be regarded. The Ninth Circuit has taken a dim view of such an approach. *See Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist.*, 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir.

2003) ("Here, the district court... misapplied the standard of review, failed to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Raad, the nonmoving party, and impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the jury's.") NEA's attack on the evidence concerning its role in the assignment and employment of Tom Harvey must be decided by the jury at trial, rather than by dispositive motion practice. A summary judgment motion is an inappropriate forum for resolution of these issues. *See Woodward v. Amertech Mobile Communications, Inc.*, 2000 WL 680415 (S.D. Ind. 3/20/00 at *1-2) ("Too easily, however, a motion for summary judgment can turn into a massive paper trial that only adds delay and expense because material facts are plainly in dispute").

NEA's summary judgment motion should, in all respects, be denied.

DATED this 22nd day of December 2005.

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